This paper studies the relationship between investor protection and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to …rms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between …nanciers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more risk taking. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, the relationship between investor protection and income inequality is non monotonic, since the risk-taking effect dominates at low levels of investor protection, while risk sharing becomes stronger when more risk is taken. Empirical evidence from up to sixty-seven countries spanning the period 1976-2004 supports the predictions of the model. JEL Classi…cation: D31, E44, O16
Introduction
The literature on institutions, law and economics has shown that investor protection a¤ects signi…cantly the …nancial structure of an economy, and has investigated the e¤ects of …nancial development on economic performance in terms of GDP growth, productivity and investment. 1 What has received less attention is that investor protection, through its e¤ect on …nancial structure and the allocation of risk, may in ‡uence the risk taking behavior of investors and …rms, thereby a¤ecting income inequality. To …ll this gap, this paper investigates the link between investor protection and income inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It proposes a model where investor protection promotes risk sharing between …nanciers and entrepreneurs, thereby inducing more risk taking in the economy. Better risk sharing and wider risk taking, in turn, a¤ect income inequality in opposite ways. The main results of the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a simple model of investors and entrepreneurs where agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in ability. Investors decide how to allocate their endowment between safe loans (debt) and diversi…ed portfolios of risky (equity-like) assets, while entrepreneurs face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, whose probability of success depends on ability. Starting up a …rm entails a …xed entry cost that entrepreneurs must cover by borrowing. Financial markets are subject to a moral hazard problem arising from the non-observability of output to …nanciers. Measures of investor protection alleviate this …nancial friction. In particular, I assume that investor protection promotes transparency by imposing a cost to misreport cash ‡ow. 2 For instance, this cost can be thought of as the additional honorary an auditor would charge to certify a falsi…ed book or to design …nancial operations to hide revenues from outside …nanciers.
Better guarantees generate more con…dence among investors, thereby making them more willing to insure the entrepreneurs through lending. It follows that in …nancial systems with stronger investor protection there is more equity-like external …nance relative to debt, which o¤ers entrepreneurs a higher degree of risk sharing. Finally, I rule out wealth heterogeneity among agents, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability), …nancial market conditions and income risk. 3 In the model, better investor protection a¤ects income inequality in two ways. (i) It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for the agents operating the risky technology; and (ii) it raises the share of entrepreneurs choosing the risky option, and therefore being exposed to earnings risk. While (i) tends to reduce inequality, (ii) raises it.
The analysis shows that the "risk taking"e¤ect (ii) dominates when investor protection is low since risky entrepreneurs still face a considerable earnings risk, while the "risk sharing" e¤ect (i) prevails when investor protection is high since better insurance applies to a large mass of risky entrepreneurs. Hence, the relationship between investor protection and income inequality is predicted to be non-monotonic. Moreover, since investor protection a¤ects the …nancial structure of the economy, the same non-monotonic relationship holds between the share of equity-like external …nance and inequality.
To evaluate empirically the main results of the model, I consider a dataset covering up to sixty-seven countries observed between 1976 and 2004. The choice of a cross-country analysis is dictated by the fact that investor protection is generally set by law and hence exhibits little within-country variation. A major challenge for the empirical part is to …nd appropriate measures of the relevant variables. I adopt two proxies for inequality: …rst, the Gini coe¢ cient of the income distribution, which is available for a relatively large sample of countries and years. Although the model refers to entrepreneurs, which belong to the top income percentiles, three main arguments may justify the use of a general indicator of inequality. 4 First, recent evidence from several countries suggests that a large fraction of the variation in income inequality over the last two decades is explained by changes at the top of the distribution (see, among others, Atkinson et al., 2009 and Heathcote et al., 2010) . Second, employees normally earn higher wages and are subject to higher employment risk when working in more productive and riskier …rms. 5 Hence the results obtained for entrepreneurs may be expected to trickle down to all workers. Finally, the model could also be interpreted as one of occupational choice à la Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979) , where each agent can either be a worker receiving a …xed wage or an entrepreneur facing risk. In this case, the implications on earnings inequality would refer to the entire population. Nonetheless, for robustness, I replicate part of the analysis proxying inequality with the ratio of the top 1st to 10th percentiles of the income distribution. The main shortcoming with this variable, recently compiled by Alvaredo et al. (2011) , is its very limited cross-sectional availability (at present, the database covers only 23 countries).
Turning to the independent variables, I proxy investor protection with the de jure index compiled by La Porta et al. (2006) , and estimate its non-linear relationship with inequality.
Unfortunately, this series is available for a relatively limited number of countries and does not exhibit any time variation. To exploit the wider cross-section of the data on inequality and its time-series dimension, I evaluate empirically the theoretical mechanism following a two-step approach. Since the model predicts that investor protection a¤ects inequality through its e¤ect on the optimal …nancial contract, I …rst show that better protection tends to coincide with a higher share of equity-like external …nance, and then I estimate a nonlinear relationship between the indicator of …nancial structure and inequality on a wider cross-section and a panel. The results suggest that inequality varies non-monotonically both with investor protection and the relative weight of equity-like …nance, as predicted by the model. The paper is related to four main strands of literature. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , as well as La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999 Porta et al. ( , 2006 , show that investor protection, and in general institutions aimed at contractual protection, a¤ect the …nancial structure of an economy by promoting the development of stock markets, but have unclear e¤ects on economic performance. No attention was devoted, however, to study the e¤ects on inequality.
Theoretical contributions from the growth literature (see Aghion and Bolton, 1997 , Banerjee and Newman, 1993 , Galor and Zeira, 1993 , Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990 , and Piketty, 1997, among others) have proposed explanations for the relationship between …nancial development, inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from heterogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. 6 As the poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making the e¢ cient investment. Over time, capital accumulation determines the dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach in two main respects. First, the …nancial friction a¤ects the share of risk borne by agents, rather than the amount of external …nance available to them. Second, I consider a di¤erent source of ex-ante heterogeneity (entrepreneurial ability), and propose a new mechanism translating di¤erences in ability into income inequality that is independent of wealth accumulation. In the present paper, heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of risk sharing and risk taking ultimately determine the income distribution. 7 6 The …nancial friction may consist in the non-observability of ex-post outcomes as in Banerjee and Newman (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993) , or of e¤ort as in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) . 7 Similarly to this paper, in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) income inequality is generated by managerial incentives. Antunes et al. (2008) propose a quantitative model with heterogeneity in wealth and ability where weak …nancial institutions hinder growth and raise income inequality. Yet, both papers abstract from …rm-speci…c idiosyncratic risk. This paper also contributes to the recent literature on the macroeconomic implications of entrepreneurship which addresses the e¤ects of …nancial frictions on investment, growth and volatility through their impact on entrepreneurial choices (see Quadrini, 2010 for a review). The papers focusing on distributional issues tend to consider …nancial frictions as a factor that perpetuates and exacerbates wealth inequality by a¤ecting the investment and saving choices of entrepreneurs, and abstract from entrepreneurial risk sharing and risk taking. Other papers relate …nancial institutions and entrepreneurship to growth through risk sharing, risk taking, and managerial ability, but do not study inequality.
For instance, Castro et al. (2004) show that …nancial frictions may slow down aggregate capital accumulation due to imperfect risk sharing, and that the overall e¤ect on growth may be ambiguous. Michelacci and Schivardi (2011) argue that, if …rms cannot diversify away their idiosyncratic risk due to …nancial frictions, there is less risk taking and this has negative e¤ects on growth. Thesmar and Thoenig (2011) point out that increased participation of shareholders, by providing better risk sharing, induces higher risk taking and volatility among public companies, and has the opposite e¤ect on private …rms without access to risk sharing. Caselli and Gennaioli (2011) show that weak contract enforcement deteriorates productivity (TFP) by discouraging untalented family-…rm owners from hiring competent managers (as in Burkart et al., 2003) .
The vast empirical literature on …nancial development and economic performance (see Levine, 2005 and references therein) provides evidence that deeper …nancial markets foster growth. Very little attention was paid to the e¤ects of …nancial development on income inequality. Two recent contributions (see Clarke et al., 2006 and Beck et al., 2007) show that higher availability of credit to the private sector tends to reduce income inequality.
My results are consistent with this evidence, but also provide a novel insight suggesting that equity-like …nance, promoting risk taking, may increase inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of entrepreneurial choice and shows how earnings and the degree of risk taking vary in equilibrium with investor protection. In section 3, I characterize analytically and by means of numerical solution how income inequality responds to changes in investor protection and …nancial structure. Section 4 brie ‡y discusses some reasons why investor protection may be imperfect and vary across countries. Section 5 provides empirical evidence from up to sixty-seven countries over the period supporting the main results of the model, and section 6 concludes.
The model
In this section, I propose a simple static model where risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial ability, have to choose between safe and risky projects and need external …nance. Asymmetric information in the …nancial market generates a moral hazard problem that makes it too costly for some entrepreneurs to …nance risky projects. Investor protection may alleviate moral hazard, thereby easing the conditions of access to …nance and promoting both risk sharing and risk taking.
Set up
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents whose preferences are represented by
where E is the expectation operator, c is consumption of a homogeneous good, and the utility function satis…es the following properties: u 0 > 0, u 00 < 0 and lim c!0 u 0 (c) = 1.
Agents are heterogeneous in their ability, denoted by 2 [0; 1], drawn from a continuously di¤erentiable distribution G ( ), but have no wealth endowment. They work as self-employed entrepreneurs and can choose to produce the consumption good using either a safe or a risky technology. Their consumption may be heterogeneous and depend on individual ability and technological choice. The capital needed for production may be raised on the international …nancial market, where a risk-free asset yielding a gross return r is traded, along with risky assets that will be described later. The price of the consumption good and the safe interest rate are determined on the world market and are assumed to be constant and normalized to 1.
Technology
Each entrepreneur with ability can choose between a safe and a risky technology. The former generates a constant level of production which is independent of ability:
The performance of …rms using the risky technology depends on entrepreneurial ability. 8 For simplicity, I assume that ability only a¤ects the probability of success and not the quantities produced. 9 In particular, an entrepreneur with ability generates output
where ' 2 (0; 1) and y H and y L denote production in the good and bad state respectively.
This implies that a …rm's expected cash ‡ow is [ + (1 )']A, which is increasing in ability. Success is i.i.d. within each ability group, hence there is no aggregate risk and total production of entrepreneurs with ability equals g ( )
is the density of the ability distribution. Moreover, I assume that, regardless of their technological choice, entrepreneurs have to pay a …xed entry cost of 1 that can be covered by raising funds on the international …nancial market.
Financial market
I assume that investors in the international …nancial market are atomistic and risk-averse, and have perfect information about the risk-free interest rate (r = 1), production technologies (B, A and '), the individual ability of each entrepreneur ( ) and her technological choice, but cannot observe …nal output (y).
The …nancial contract entails the commitment of the …rm to repay after production a certain amount, possibly contingent on the reported realization of output. Since production functions and technological choices are public information, entrepreneurs using the safe technology are known to generate with certainty a cash ‡ow of B and thus face a …x repayment equal to the international gross risk-free rate, 1, which gives them a payo¤ of
The situation is di¤erent if the borrower runs a risky project. Once production has occurred, an unlucky entrepreneur can only report output y L = 'A, and hence repay to investors the cash ‡ow minus her earnings: y L w L ( ). If successful, the entrepreneur may misreport the output realization and pretend to be in the bad state, in order to repay y L w L ( ) instead of y H w H ( ). However, I assume that measures of investor protection, speci…c to the borrower's country, make misreporting costly. For every unit of hidden cash ‡ow, the …rm incurs a cost p 2 [0; 1], so that the payo¤ from misreporting is 9 Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of success in risky enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the technological choice. In the next section, I argue that this second e¤ect can be introduced into the model without a¤ecting the qualitative results. The relevant assumption is that ability is more important in the risky sector, which seems realistic. w L ( ) + (1 p) y H y L . Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal to that of misreporting. Therefore, the …nancial contract w H ( ) ; w L ( ) must satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
Financial contracts are set to maximize the entrepreneur's expected utility, V R ( ), subject to the IC constraint and the outsiders'participation constraint. The latter requires that investors be indi¤erent between lending to all entrepreneurs with ability , and buying the risk-free asset. 10 Thus, the payo¤s from the risky choice are determined as the solution to the optimal …nancial contract problem:
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
and investors'participation constraint:
Note that a pooled portfolio of loans to the i.i.d. entrepreneurs with ability yields the LHS of (PC) with certainty, so that investors face no uncertainty. 11 
Equilibrium
Each entrepreneur with ability has rational expectations and chooses technology, T 2 fS; Rg (safe or risky), to maximize her expected utility:
where
In other words, every entrepreneur chooses technology, given her individual ability and the optimal …nancial contract fw H ( ) ; w L ( )g which solves (P 1).
De…nition Given the cost of misreporting, p, the equilibrium for this small open economy is de…ned as the set of technological choices and …nancial contracts fT ( ) ; w H ( ) ; w L ( ) 2[0; 1] , such that each agent with ability solves (P2), with payo¤ s solving (P1) subject to (IC') and (PC).
For simplicity, I assume that 'A < B < A, which implies that the risky technology is on average more productive than the safe one for some entrepreneurs.
Solution
To solve for the optimal technological choice (P 2), entrepreneurs need to know the payo¤s from the risky project, determined by the optimal …nancial contract fw H ( ) ; w L ( )g 2[0;1] .
Therefore, I proceed backwards and start by solving problem (P1) subject to (IC') and
(PC). I …rst obtain the optimal contract under e¢ cient markets (with no information asymmetry) and then compute the optimal payo¤s in the presence of asymmetric information for a given level of investor protection. Next, I characterize the technological choice fT ( )g 2[0;1] , given the optimal payo¤s. Finally, I show how the equilibrium varies with the degree of investor protection.
Optimal …nancial contract: e¢ cient markets
If investors could perfectly observe the cash ‡ow of a …rm, misreporting would be impossible, and hence the optimal …nancial contract would simply maximize the expected utility of a risk-averse borrower with success probability (P1) subject to the participation constraint of a perfectly diversi…ed lender (PC). Thus, investors would provide entrepreneurs with full insurance in exchange for an expected gross return equal to the safe rate, as analytically shown in the …rst order conditions:
where u 0 is the …rst derivative of u and w F B ( ) denotes the e¢ cient, …rst-best, payo¤ of a risky entrepreneur with ability , which is equal to her expected cash ‡ow, increasing in ability, minus the risk-free interest rate repayment.
Optimal …nancial contract: Asymmetric information
If the cash ‡ow cannot be observed by outsiders, entrepreneurs may have an incentive to misreport, and hence the optimal …nancial contract must also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (IC'). The …rst-best contract solves (P1) subject to (IC') and
(PC) only if investor protection drives the gain from misreporting down to zero, which happens only for p = 1. This means that when investor protection is perfect (p = 1), outside …nanciers can behave as if they were perfectly informed, and thus fully insure entrepreneurs without inducing them to misreport. Investors'participation constraint (P C) needs also hold with equality, so that the optimal …nancial contract satis…es the following …rst order conditions:
Technological choice
Entrepreneurs with ability will choose the risky technology if it gives at least the same expected utility as the safe project:
Since the state-contingent payo¤s of a risky entrepreneur, w H ( ) and w L ( ) in equations (1) and (2), increase with ability ( ), while the di¤erence between them is independent of it, her expected utility, V R , is also increasing with ability. Expected utility of a safe entrepreneur, instead, is constant and does not depend on ability. This implies that the solution to the technological choice problem (P 2) features a threshold ability level such that the agents with ability higher than choose the risky technology while those with lower ability choose the safe project. This property is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique such that 8 ; u w H ( ) + (1 ) u w L ( ) u(w S )); and w H ( ) ; w L ( ) is the solution to (P 1) subject to (IC 0 ) and (P C):
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, due to risk aversion, the expected payo¤ of risky entrepreneurs with ability equal to the threshold, w H ( ) + (1 ) w L ( ), must be higher than the safe earnings, w S .
Investor protection and the equilibrium
To study how investor protection a¤ects the equilibrium of the model, I …rst focus on the optimal …nancial contract and then on technological choice. The optimal payo¤s of risky entrepreneurs can be conveniently re-written as
The …rst component, w F B ( ), represents the payo¤ of a risky entrepreneur with ability under perfect investor protection (p = 1). The second term is the adjustment that investors have to set to induce truth-telling, which is state contingent and varies with ability and investor protection. This term is positive in the good and negative in the bad state to o¤set the temptation of an entrepreneur to misreport cash ‡ow. It is decreasing in p because when the unit cost of hiding cash ‡ow is high, the temptation to misreport is low and hence a smaller deviation from the …rst best is enough to achieve truth-telling. It follows that also the wedge between state-contingent earnings, w H ( ) w L ( ), measuring the price that entrepreneurs have to pay for the temptation to misreport, is decreasing in investor protection. Moreover, since more skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to be in the good state, and hence to be tempted to hide cash ‡ow, higher ability implies lower payo¤s in both states relative to the e¢ cient case, as long as investor protection is not perfect. Overall, both w H ( ) and w L ( ) are increasing in entrepreneurial ability, as clearly suggested by equations (1) and (2). Finally, notice that for p = 0, the …nancial contract is akin to debt, implying a constant repayment equal to the risk-free rate, and the entire risk is borne by the entrepreneur. As investor protection increases, investors bear more and more risk, which makes the …nancial contract closer to equity.
Expected earnings of a risky entrepreneur with ability ,
are equal to the …rst best payo¤, w F B ( ), and do not vary with investor protection. Her expected utility, due to risk aversion, falls when the di¤erence between state-contingent earnings grows. Therefore, a rise in p, by reducing the gap between w H ( ) and w L ( ), increases the expected utility of risky entrepreneurs, V R .
Since equilibrium earnings are functions of investor protection and the technological parameters, also the threshold ability varies with p, A, ' and B, as formalized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2
The threshold ability is a decreasing function of investor protection (p) and technological level of the risky sector (A); it increases with the riskiness of the risky technology (inverse of ') and the productivity of the safe one (B):
Intuitively, stronger investor protection allows entrepreneurs to better share risks with investors, thereby raising the expected utility drawn from the risky project. Since payo¤s and hence V R are increasing in ability, a rise in p makes the risky technology preferable to the most able among safe entrepreneurs, i.e. reduces threshold ability . A higher A implies that productivity of the risky project increases, and more so in the good state. As a consequence, payo¤s rise but also the wedge between them. Since the overall e¤ect on expected utility is positive, a more productive technology reduces the threshold ability for risky entrepreneurship. The parameter ' captures the riskiness of the risky technology (maximum risk for ' = 0, no risk for ' = 1), and also a¤ects its expected productivity. If it grows, it makes the risky option preferable to the most able among safe entrepreneurs because it reduces the volatility of state-contingent earnings and increases their expected value, thereby raising expected utility. Trivially, higher productivity in the safe industry, B, makes it more attractive, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to adopt the safe technology, which rises the threshold .
The threshold also depends on risk aversion, since the curvature of the utility function a¤ects expected utility for given probability of success ( , i.e., ability). For instance, under CRRA utility with relative risk aversion equal to or higher than one, the risky technology is not run in equilibrium ( = 1) as long as the earnings of the most able in the bad state are non positive, i.e., for p
Alternatively, when risk aversion is su¢ ciently low, there may be entrepreneurs choosing the risky project even in the absence of investor protection ( p=0 = max < 1).
In the case of perfect investor protection (p = 1), the risky technology gives higher expected utility than the safe one whenever its expected productivity is higher:
Therefore, it is easy to derive a closed form solution for the threshold ability,
and verify that it lies in the support of under the hypothesis that 'A < B < A.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (0 p < 1), the expression for the threshold is more involved. However, the payo¤s are easily obtained as:
where w H ( ) and w L ( ) are given by (1) and (2). Henceforth, I denote the threshold abilities associated with p = 1 and 0 p < 1 by p=1 and p<1 , respectively. Figure 1 : Ability and Earnings in Equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium ability-earnings pro…les. If there is perfect investor protection, p = 1, income of entrepreneurs is described by the solid line. It is ‡at and equal to w S for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for the more talented ones, who run the risky project. Due to perfect risk sharing, earnings are constant across states. If investor protection drops to 0 p < 1 (dashed line), …nancing a risky …rm becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among entrepreneurs to shift to the safe technology. Graphically, (1) the mass of risky …rms shrinks, i.e., the ‡at segment of the earnings pro…le becomes longer. I de…ne this as the "risk taking" e¤ect. (2) Earnings become state contingent, and the wedge between w H p<1 and w L p<1 widens as p falls due to worse risk sharing. I call this the "risk sharing" e¤ect. The fact that imperfect insurance reduces expected utility of risky entrepreneurs is captured by the jump in expected earnings at the threshold p<1 .
Note that safe entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between raising external …nance through standard debt and equity-like contracts. Risky …rms instead can only be started if …nanced through equity-like instruments. This implies that, in the presence of an in…nitesimal cost of signing the optimal …nancial contract, safe entrepreneurs choose debt, and hence the …nancial structure of the economy, described by the weight of equity in total external …nance, is captured in the model by the size of the risky sector, which is denoted as 1 G ( ) for empirical purpose. This measure is decreasing in the threshold ability and increasing in investor protection, and varies with technological parameters.
Corollary 1
The weight of equities in total external …nance, , is decreasing in the threshold ability ( ), the riskiness of the risky technology (inverse of ') and the productivity of the safe one (B):
it is increasing in investor protection (p) and technological level of the risky sector (A):
Evaluating income distribution
In this section, I study how investor protection a¤ects income inequality. I consider measures of inequality accounting for the entire distribution of income such as the variance and the Gini coe¢ cient, and show analytically and by means of numerical solution how these respond to changes in investor protection and in the …nancial structure.
Analytical results
A …rst measure of inequality that takes into account the entire income distribution is the variance of the earnings realizations:
is the average income in the economy. Lemma 3 proves E [w] to be increasing in investor protection.
Intuitively, an increase in the cost of misreporting, p, gives risky entrepreneurs better insurance, thereby encouraging more agents to choose the risky technology with a higher payo¤. This implies that also aggregate production and welfare increase with investor protection. 12 Equation (3) for the variance of earnings suggests that better investor protection a¤ects inequality both through the "risk sharing" and the "risk taking" e¤ect: by the former, it closes the gap between state-contingent earnings of entrepreneurs, thereby reducing income di¤erentials among agents with the same ability, , and hence overall inequality. On the other hand, a drop in the threshold ability implies that a mass g ( ) of agents switches to state-contingent earnings, which is likely to translate into higher inequality.
To better evaluate these forces and the overall e¤ect of investor protection on inequality, it is useful to write down the analytical expression for the derivative of the variance of the earnings distribution with respect to p: dV ar dp
The …rst term captures the "risk sharing" e¤ect of investor protection, which tends to reduce inequality and is stronger the larger is the mass of risky entrepreneurs, i.e. the lower the threshold ability , as analytically proven in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 For a given threshold ability of risky entrepreneurs , better investor protection reduces the variance of the earnings distribution:
@V ar @p 0:
The second term in (4) captures the "risk taking" e¤ect, whereby investor protection may increase inequality. This happens to the extent that the marginal risky entrepreneurs make the earnings distribution more dispersed, that is if the earnings of agents with ability di¤er enough from the average. Lemma 5 proves analytically that investor protection tends to increase inequality through the "risk taking"e¤ect, provided that is su¢ ciently high. 13 Lemma 5 Necessary condition for @V ar=@ < 0 is that the threshold in the absence of investor protection, p=0 , is high enough:
The overall impact of investor protection on income inequality depends on the strength of the "risk sharing"and "risk taking"e¤ects. In particular, when the cost of misreporting, and hence the size of the risky sector, is close to its maximum, the "risk taking" e¤ect is weak, since the marginal entrepreneurs do not add much to the existing mass of risky …rms.
The "risk sharing"e¤ect is instead very strong since it applies to nearly all potential risky entrepreneurs, and hence an increase in p reduces inequality. When investor protection is very low, there is a small mass of risky …rms in the economy and hence the "risk taking" e¤ect is stronger at the margin, while the "risk sharing" e¤ect is weak since it applies to few entrepreneurs. It follows that inequality may be a non-monotonic function of investor protection, as proven in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Provided that Lemma 5 holds, the variance of the earnings distribution is increasing in investor protection for low values of p and decreasing for high p:
lim p!0 dV ar (w) dp > 0 and lim p!1 dV ar (w) dp < 0:
Since, from Corollary 1, the relative weight of equity-like instruments in overall external …nance, , is continuous and monotonic in investor protection, also the relationship between and income inequality follows the non-monotonic pattern of Proposition 1, to the extent that the variation in …nancial structure is driven by changes in investor protection.
Proposition 2 For given parameters {A, B, '} and ability distribution G ( ), and provided that Lemma 5 holds, the variance of the earnings distribution is increasing in the relative weight of equity-like instruments in overall external …nance, 1 G ( ), for low values of and decreasing for high :
After characterizing analytically the main forces driving the relationship between investor protection and inequality, it is useful to pause and consider whether changing some assumptions would a¤ect the results. First, ability is assumed to a¤ect productivity only when the entrepreneur chooses the risky technology. If this assumption was relaxed, the qualitative results are likely to hold as long as the expected marginal return to ability is lower in the safe than in the risky sector. Intuitively, in this case, the ability-earnings schedule of safe entrepreneurs in Figure 1 would feature, instead of a ‡at line, a straight one with lower slope and higher intercept than that of risky entrepreneurs. While this would raise the degree of inequality under p = 0, and may weaken the "risk taking" effect, it does not seem to change the forces giving rise to the non-monotonic relationship between investor protection and inequality. 14 The …nancial friction in the model is given by ex-post asymmetric information about entrepreneurial outcomes, generating a moral hazard problem. It may be argued though that credit markets are also subject to ex-ante asymmetric information on the quality of the borrowers, which may give rise to adverse selection. If in addition ability was exante unobservable, investors would have to induce entrepreneurs to truthfully reveal it by o¤ering them a menu of …nancial contracts such that agents with a certain level of ability would be worse o¤ declaring a higher , since earnings are proportional to it. Therefore, the degree of risk sharing would be decreasing in ability. This may weaken both the "risk sharing"and the "risk taking"e¤ect. While adding this friction to the model would complicate the analytical characterization, it does not seem to qualitatively a¤ect the forces behind the non-monotonic relationship between investor protection and inequality, since the risk taking e¤ect would still be stronger at low levels of investor protection and risk sharing would dominate at high levels.
Finally, the assumption of …xed capital requirement implies that entrepreneurs only decide whether to take risk or not (extensive margin), but not how much risk to take (intensive margin). In reality, the degree of entrepreneurial risk taking varies along both margins, and it is therefore meaningful to wonder how the results would change if also the intensive margin was introduced in the model. Castro et al. (2004) show, within a similar framework, that investor protection may have an ambiguous e¤ect on the intensive margin of risk taking (i.e. continuous capital investment in the risky technology). Hence, it is not a priori obvious whether introducing the intensive margin would strengthen or weaken the "risk taking"e¤ect. Moreover, the presence of the intensive margin is unlikely to alter the "risk sharing" e¤ect.
Numerical solution
Although intuitive, the full characterization of inequality as a function of investor protection is awkward to derive analytically, given the highly non-linear expression for V ar (w).
Solving the model numerically allows me to easily compute alternative measures of inequality and study how they vary with the parameter p. To this end, I assume that utility is logaritmic and the ability distribution is lognormal with mean and variance taken from the actual distribution of years of schooling for the US, and set the technological parameters (A, B and ') so as to satisfy the model restrictions. 15 First, I solve the model under di¤erent riskiness parameters to generate variation in the threshold ability for given investor protection. 16 Based on the earnings distributions derived numerically, I protection. Note …rst that in the simulation for low risk, nearly all entrepreneurs choose the risky technology independently of investor protection, so that the necessary condition of Lemma 5 is violated and the "risk taking"e¤ect is not at work. Only in this special case, inequality is unambiguously decreasing in p. When Lemma 5 holds, for higher riskiness, inequality is increasing in investor protection when p is su¢ ciently low, and becomes decreasing when investor protection gets high enough. The "risk sharing" channel is e¤ectively illustrated by the downward-sloping lines for the low-risk technology, which exhibit a sharp decline in inequality associated to an increase in p when nearly all …rms adopt the risky technology independently of investor protection. The "risk taking" e¤ect is instead captured by the initial upward-sloping part of the lines for the middle and high risk cases, and by the fact that, for any value of p, inequality is higher when the riskiness is lower and hence risk taking is larger.
Optimality and political viability of investor protection
In the model, perfect investor protection is ex-ante Pareto e¢ cient, since it raises both aggregate income and the expected utility of all agents. This is due to the absence of costs, which implies that the level of investor protection that both the social planner and individual agents would chose is p = 1. In the real world however, we do not observe perfect investor protection, and reforms aimed at improving it may be opposed by di¤erent interest groups in the society, as argued by the literature on the political determinants of …nancial institutions (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003 Assuming that enforcing investor protection entails a cost, c (p) with c 0 ( ) > 0, e.g.
given by the monitoring and judicial activities, would immediately imply that a benevolent social planner would choose imperfect investor protection. The reason is that the marginal value of investor protection,
tends to zero for p = 1. Moreover, if the cost has to be …nanced through uniform lump-sum taxation, even a socially optimal p < 1 could be politically di¢ cult to implement because there would be a constituency against it. In particular, an increase in investor protection would be opposed by the least and the most able agents since they would bear the cost withouth enjoying enough bene…t from risk sharing. In other words, the constituency against investor protection would be formed by the more productive, and ex-post richer, incumbents of the risky sector and the least able outsiders, which recalls the result in The model also abstracts from wealth heterogeneity, so that the ex-post income distribution, only depends on ability, investor protection and luck. If wealth heterogeneity was introduced, the implications for income inequality would become more complicated to derive. Yet, more insights may arise for the political economy of investor protection, because the composition of the constituencies considered above would also be a¤ected by wealth. On the one hand richer agents, as entrepreneurs do not bene…t much from investor protection since safe returns from investment account for a larger part of their total income. On the other hand, as investors, they would bene…t from the e¤ect that investor protection might have on the interest rate. 17 
Empirical Analysis
In this section, I evaluate empirically the main theoretical predictions derived in section 3.
Since investor protection is generally determined by law, it is not expected to exhibit large variation across geographical areas or sectors within a country. Hence, cross-country data, . 18 Although the theory proposed in 1 7 As shown in Bon…glioli (2005) , in a general equilibrium version of the model, investor protection would raise productivity and hence the interest rate. 1 8 The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least …ve years, on 137 countries over the period . Countries di¤er with respect to the survey coverage (national vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and the unit of observation (households vs individuals). For better comparability, data from Deininger and Squire are usually adjusted by adding 6.6 to the Gini coe¢ cients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment was made in a slightly more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay (2002) for details. the paper refers to entrepreneurs, who usually belong to the top percentiles of the income distribution, three arguments may justify the use of a general indicator of inequality. 19 First, recent evidence from several countries shows that a large fraction of the variation in income inequality over the last two decades is explained by changes at the top of that takes values between 0 (no protection) and 10 (maximum protection). This index is available for 49 developed and developing countries and has no time variation, which is its main limitation.
Next, I adopt an alternative approach and evaluate the predictions of the model in two steps. I …rst take to the data Corollary 1, arguing that the relative weight of equity in external …nance should be a positive function of investor protection, and then Proposition 2, establishing the non-monotonic relationship between the indicator of …nancial structure 1 9 This would be a serious concern if investor protection a¤ected inequality among the poor in the same way as predicted by the model, but through a di¤erent channel, thereby generating a bias in favor of the model. If, however, there was no e¤ect, or an opposite one, this would just be a source of attenuation bias.
2 0 Evidence that more productive …rms pay higher wages is provided, among others, by Oi and Idson (1999) . and inequality. 21 The advantage of this strategy is that it allows me to enlarge the cross- Consistently with the empirical evidence in La Porta et al. (2006) , the plot in Figure   3 suggests that better investor protection is associated to a larger relative size of the stock market. 22 Figure 4 plots instead …ve-year observations of the Ginis against relative stock market size. Despite showing unconditional correlations only, it is suggestive of a non-monotonic relationship, as predicted by the model. 23 2 1 In the model, …nancial structure varies with other parameters, as summarized in Corollary 1. These variables may only a¤ect quantitatively but not qualitatively the non-monotonicity of the relation between investor protection and inequality through …nancial structure, for instance by determining where its sign is inverted. 2 2 The OLS and IV regressions reported in the next subsection con…rm that the correlation between investor protection and the ratio of stock market capitalization over private credit is positive and signi…cant. 2 3 In the regression analysis, the non-monotonicity is shown to be statistically signi…cant and robust to the inclusion of controls and the exclusion of outliers. 
Cross-sectional Estimates
First, I focus on the cross-section of 47 countries and estimate with Ordinary Least Squares the following equation for the overall e¤ect of investor protection on inequality:
where Gini is the measure of income inequality, i is the country index, IP is the indicator of investor protection, IP _HIGH is a dummy taking value one for IP above the median, X is a vector of control variables, and is the error term. 24 qualitatively and quantitatively very close to the ones for period averages. These results suggest that the relationship between investor protection and income inequality is nonmonotonic in the way predicted by the model.
In the model, investor protection a¤ects income inequality through its e¤ect on the …nancial structure of the economy, which in turn a¤ects entrepreneurial risk taking and thereby income realizations. I evaluate whether better investor protection tilts the …nancial structure towards equity rather than debt by estimating the following equation:
where SM is the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit to the private sector,
Z is a vector of control variables, and e is the error term. Data are averaged over the Next, I turn to the second step and consider the relationship between …nancial structure and inequality on a wider cross-section. 25 In particular, I estimate the following equation
and report the results in Table 3 . The estimates con…rm that human capital plays an important role at reducing inequality and lend support to the Kuznets hypothesis of an inverse-U shaped relationship between per capita income and inequality. The most novel result, however, is that …nancial structure seems to be an important, yet so far overlooked, covariate of inequality. In particular the signi…cant estimates of a positive~ 1 and a negative~ 2 , are consistent with the model prediction. The fact that the results are robust to controlling for per capita GDP and its square reassures that the non-monotonic relationship between relative stock market size and inequality is not spuriously driven by the level of income of a country. Robustness to the inclusion of government expenditure in columns 4 and 8 also suggests that the results in the previous columns are not driven by redistributive policies or openness to trade, which may be correlated with …nancial structure. As in Table 1 , to correct for a possible simultaneity, in columns 5-8, I take the last available observation of the Gini coe¢ cient for each country and regress it on the same variables as in columns [1] [2] [3] [4] . The estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively very close to the ones for period averages. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that an increase in the relative size of the stock market should reduce inequality only after getting to a level (between 1.34 and 1.53) that only a few countries have reached in the sample.
Panel Estimates
The time-series variation in the data on …nancial structure allow me to better exploit the information contained in the time-varying data for inequality, and estimate with least squares the following equation:
where time subscripts refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods between 1976 and 2000, all regressors are the same as described above, and it is the error term. I estimate equation (6) both considering it as a random e¤ect, thereby exploiting both time and cross-sectional variation, and under the assumption that it = i + " it where i is the country …xed e¤ect. In the second case, the link between …nancial structure and inequality is identi…ed out of within-country variation. In both cases, the reported standard errors are clustered by country and robust. A positive estimate for 1 and a negative one for 2 would be consistent with the model prediction that better investor protection, by raising the weight of stocks in the …nancial structure, tends to increase inequality until it becomes high enough so that the risk sharing e¤ect dominates thereby inverting the sign of the relationship.
The results are reported in Table 4 . 26 The …rst two rows tend to con…rm the result of Table 3 , that inequality is non monotonic, as suggested by the model, in the relative size of the stock market, although the positive estimate for 1 is now signi…cant even when I do not control for the quadratic term. This pattern is robust to controlling for common determinants of inequality such as real per capita GDP, government expenditure and openness to trade. The regressions in colunms 5 and 10 suggest that the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of Ghana, which appears as an outlier in Figure 4 . Notice that the results of positive 1 and, especially, negative 2 hold stronger when the coe¢ cients are estimated with random e¤ects. This makes the evidence more consistent with the predictions of the model, because the cross-sectional variation in SM , accounted for in these speci…cation, is more likely to be generated by di¤erences in investor protection than time-series changes.
The evidence presented so far is obtained using a broad measure of inequality, based on the entire income distribution, while it may be argued that the model applies to entrepreneurs who are more likely to belong to the top end of the income distribution. I address this concern by estimating equation (6) for two indicators of income inequality among the rich, such as the ratio of the average income of the top 1 (or 0.1) over the top 10 per cent of the income distribution. Note that data availability is limited to a maximum of 16 OECD countries, observed between 1976 and 2004. 27 The results, reported in Table 5 , are consistent with the ones obtained for the Gini coe¢ cients, suggesting the existence of a non-monotonic relationship whereby inequality increases with the relative size of the stock market up to a certain point and then decreases with it. Using the same restricted sample of OECD countries I am also able to account for the role of risk taking, which is what drives the positive e¤ect of investor protection on inequality in the model.
In particular, in columns 3 and 6-8, I add to the speci…cation the annual growth rate of establishments, as a proxy of …rm entry, capturing the extensive margin of risk taking.
Consistently with the theory, the estimates for entry are positive and tend to reduce the size and signi…cance of the linear coe¢ cients for relative stock market size, suggesting that its positive correlation with inequality is driven by a higher exposition to risk.
Financial Structure vs Financial Development
The results in this section document the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between investor protection, …nancial structure, and income inequality, both measured on the overall population and at the top of the income distribution. This evidence is robust and consistent with the model proposed in sections 2 and 3. Here, I assess whether the relationship found in the data refers speci…cally to investor protection and …nancial structure, or it captures a more general pattern linking inequality to …nancial development, which could be consistent with alternative theories. To this end, I add to the main speci…cations de jure indicators of creditors'rights, taking values between 0 and 4 (from Djankov et al., 2007) , and e¢ ciency of the judiciary, and control separately for the size of the stock market and total credit to the private sector, which is commonly taken as a de facto measure of …nancial depth. The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 .
In Table 6 , columns 1-2 report the content of columns 1-2 of Table 1 , while columns [3] [4] replicate it adding the two de jure indicators of institutional and …nancial development.
The coe¢ cients for investor protection remain unchanged, while the new variables are not signi…cantly correlated with inequality. Column 5, reports column 1 of Table 2 , regressing relative stock market size on investor protection, and column 6 replicates it adding the de jure index of …nancial development. Note that creditors' rights are not signi…cantly correlated with …nancial structure, which may explain the result of columns [1] [2] [3] [4] in light of the model. Since the general indicators of …nancial and institutional development are not related to …nancial structure, and hence to entrepreneurial risk taking, they do not relate to inequality either.
In columns 1-4 of Table 7 , I replicate the estimates of Table 4 , columns 1-2 and 6-7, splitting SM in stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector expressed as ratios of GDP. The results suggest that, while …nancial depth alone (PRIVO) tends to be associated to lower inequality, as found by Beck et al. (2007) and Clarke et al. (2006) , it is a higher weight of equities in the …nancial structure that may correlate positively with inequality, as long as SM is not so large that the sign of the relationship gets inverted.
Finally, given that the de jure indicator of creditors'right exhibits some time variation, I add it to the panel speci…cations of Table 4 , columns 2 and 7. The coe¢ cients reported in columns 5 and 6, consistently with the previous results, suggest that income inequality correlates in opposite ways with …nancial structure and indicators of overall …nancial development.
The evidence in Tables 6 and 7 points to the fact that the non-monotonic relationship between investor protection, …nancial structure and inequality does not generalize to other, more general, measures of …nancial development.
Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for a systematic relationship between investor protection, …nancial structure and income inequality. While there are contributions addressing the e¤ects of investor protection on …nancial structure and economic growth through risk sharing and risk taking, little attention has been paid to the implications for income distribution. To …ll this gap, I develop a simple static model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, that can produce using either a safe or a risky technology. I assume that entrepreneurs have to borrow funds in order to start their business, and that there are …nancial frictions, arising from the non-observability of a …rm's cash- ‡ow to investors.
In this framework, I study how investor protection, by alleviating frictions, a¤ects optimal …nancial contracts, the technological choice of agents with di¤erent ability and the distribution of their earnings. Better investor protection a¤ects income inequality in two opposite ways. By improving risk sharing between entrepreneurs and …nanciers, it reduces income volatility. On the other hand, by inducing more agents to choose the risky technology, it may increase the dispersion of the earnings realizations. The …rst, "risk sharing", e¤ect reduces inequality, while "risk taking" tends to raise it. The overall impact of investor protection on inequality is shown to be non-monotonic. In particular, the "risk taking"e¤ect dominates at low levels of investor protection, and is outweighed by "risk sharing"when investor protection is high. In the empirical section, I provide evidence from a cross-section of up to sixty seven countries and a panel of up to …fty-eight countries over the period that is consistent with the main theoretical predictions.
The model is deliberately kept simple to emphasize the mechanism linking investor protection to income inequality. It follows that its implications for economic performance and welfare may appear simplistic: aggregate income increases with investor protection due to risk taking, and welfare increases due to higher output and better risk sharing. Yet, an interesting insight is that investor protection, through its positive e¤ect on aggregate output and the non-monotonic impact on inequality, generates a Kuznets'curve. Contrary to existing models, this inverse-U shaped relationship between GDP and inequality is generated by the development of …nancial institutions, rather than by wealth accumulation.
Moreover, as discussed in paper, the model may be easily modi…ed to address a number of issues, such as the political economy of …nancial institutions.
A Proofs

Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B + 1 > 'A and u 0 > 0, imply that agents with = 1 always choose the risky technology since V R (1) = u(w H (1)) = u(A 1) > u (B) = V S ; while agents with = 0 always make the safe choice since V R (0) = u(w L (0)) = u('A 1) < V S . To prove that there exist a unique ability
V S for all > (<) , I just need to show that V R is increasing in . The derivative of V R w. r. t. under the optimal …nancial contract is
Therefore, there exist a unique threshold ability such that
Lemma 2
To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I characterize as implicit function of p,
and obtain its derivative with respect to p as
To prove that this derivative is negative, I just need to show that @V R @p is positive, since by Lemma 1 @V R @ > 0. I obtain
since utility is concave and w L ( ) w H ( ), implying that @ @p 0.
Moreover, lim
The threshold ability varies with the technological parameters A, ' and B as follows
and @V S t @B = u 0 (B 1) > 0:
Corollary 1
The derivative of w.r.t. is
The derivative of w.r.t. ' is
The derivative of w.r.t. A is @ @A = @ @A @ @ 0 since @ @A < 0 by Lemma 2.
Lemma 3
The derivative of average entrepreneurial earnings w.r.t. is
since, by risk aversion and the de…nition of , w S w H ( ) (1 ) w L ( ).
Lemma 4
The partial derivative of V ar (w) w.r.t. p is @V ar @p =
which becomes, after simplifying and replacing for w H , w L , @w H @p = (1 ) (1 ') A and @w L @p = (1 ') A, @V ar @p
To prove that this derivative is higher the higher is the threshold ability , I obtain the derivative of @V ar (w) =@p w.r.t. and show that it is positive:
@ @V ar @p @ = 2 (1 p) (1 ') 2 A 2 (1 ) g ( ) 0:
Lemma 5
Derive the partial derivative of V ar (w) w.r.t. the threshold, :
This is positive, @V ar @ > 0, i¤
that is, since both 2E [w] w S w L ( ) and w H ( ) w L ( ) are positive, i¤:
Multiplying and dividing by A (1 ') ; and substituting (B 'A) =A (1 ') = p=1 (the …rst-best threshold) delivers, after further simpli…cations:
which holds for the threshold high enough relative to its …rst-best value, p=1 . Since the highest is associated to p = 0, necessary condition for the existence of at least one value of p so that @V ar
1=2 :
Proposition 1
Compute the limit of dV ar dp at the extreme values of p. For p ! 0, ! p=0 satisfying Lemma 5, so that lim p!0 @V ar @ > 0, and
hence: lim p!0 dV ar dp = @V ar @ @ @p 0:
For p ! 1, w H ( ) ! w L ( ) for any , and w H ( ) = w L ( ) = w S , hence @ @p ! 0, @V ar @ ! 0 and dV ar dp ! 0. To verify that it approaches zero from above, express dV ar dp in second order Taylor expansion in a neighborhood of p = 1: lim p!1 dV ar dp = (p 1)
For given parameters and ability distribution, the derivative of the variance of earnings w.r.t. can be expressed as:
dV ar d = dV ar dp d dp 1 = dV ar dp g ( ) d dp 1 :
As p ! 0, Proposition 1 and the non-degenerate ability distribution imply that: lim p!0 dV ar d = @V ar @ @ @p g ( ) d dp 1 0:
As p ! 1, d dp ! 0 since @ @p ! 0, and hence lim p!1 dV ar d = (p 1) d 2 V ar d dp = (p 1) 2 4 d 2 V ar (dp) 2 d dp 1 p=1 d 2 (dp) 2 dV ar dp d dp which is negative since d 2 V ar (dp) 2 > 0, lim p!1 dV ar dp < 0 from Proposition 1, d dp > 0 from Corollary 1, and lim p!1 d 2 (dp) 2 < 0 since the threshold is convex as proven below. Derive d 2 (dp) 2 = d 2 V R d dp dV R dp
This is conveniently expressed multiplied by the positive term dV R d :
which is positive since u 0 w L ( ) > u 0 w H ( ) and u 00 w L ( ) u 00 w H ( ) by assumption, and d dp 0.
B Numerical Solution
This section describes step by step the procedure I followed for solving numerically the 
The average years of schooling and their variance are then
with l 0 = lu, l 1 = lp, l 2 = ls and l 3 = lh. Finally, and can be derived from the expressions for mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution:
V (Q) = e 2 +2 2 e + 2 :
3. For each value of ', compute the threshold ability with perfect investor protection p=1 .
(a) De…ne a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p 2 [0; 1], and a grid of initial guesses for the threshold ability 2 p=1 ; 1 , equally spaced by 0.00005 (the …ner the grid, the better the approximation). (1) and (2) ii. for every ability A. draw the earning realization: iii. save the threshold, the variance and the Gini in (1 p) vectors, Gini year 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 last obs. last obs.
IP index investor protection
investor protection investor protection investor protection investor protection investor protection investor protection Note: the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. The regressors are: IP= investor protection, IP_HIGH= IP*dummy for IP>median (60th percentile in column 5), SCHOOL= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education, LRGDP(2)= log of real per capita GDP (squared), GOV= government expenditure, TRADE= (import+export)/GDP. Estimation is performed with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level. Note: the dependent variables are: average income of top 1 over top 10 percentile (columns [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and of top 0.1 over top 10 percentile (columns 7-10) of the income distribution. The regressors are: SM=stock market capitalization as ratio of credit to the private sector, School= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education, LRGDP= log of real per capita GDP, ENTRY= percentage annual change in the number of establishments. Estimation is performed with Least Squares with random effects (columns 1-3 and 7-8) and country fixed effects (columns 4-6 and 9-10). Robust standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level. Gini Gini Gini Gini SM SM Note: the dependent variables are the Gini coefficient of the income distribution (columns [1] [2] [3] [4] and SM= stock market capitalization as a ratio of credit to the private sector (columns [5] [6] . The regressors are: IP= investor protection, IP_HIGH= IP*dummy for IP>median, SCHOOL= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education, LRGDP= log of real per capita GDP, EFF_JUD= index of efficiency of the judiciary, CR= index of creditors' rights. Estimation is performed with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level. Note: the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. The regressors are: SM_CAP= stock market capitalization as ratio of GDP, PRIVO= credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP, SM=stock market capitalization as ratio of credit to the private sector, School= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education, CR= index of creditors' rights. Estimation is performed with Least Squares with random effects and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.
